Introduction
In the first half of the twentieth century the Australian economy made a substantial shift away from its reliance on resource-based industries. Manufacturing industry lifted its share of both output and employment. Nearly all of the growth in the share of manufacturing was accounted for by a reduction of the share of the farm and mining sectors. A very large tertiary sector, comprising services and construction, oscillated around its trend. The data sets of GDP, employment and capital formation generated by Butlin and others 1 provide the starting point for discussion. These data will be reviewed in the first section of the paper.
The conventional explanation of the relative rise of manufacturing rests largely on the role of the tariff. Rising levels of tariff protection enabled local producers to capture a larger share of the market from increasingly expensive imports. This literature on structural change will be discussed in the second section. The paper will then proceed by arguing that the previous explanations of sectoral change do not provide a convincing account of the rise of manufacturing relative to the primary sector let alone the rise and fall of industries within manufacturing and the large services sector. New data of profits at the industry level promises to provide a more accurate picture of the changing choice set facing people making strategic decisions about where to do business. 2 These data highlight the role of both changes in output prices, as captured in the discussion of tariffs and subsidies, and developments on the supply side. Technological change, endogenous and exogenous, transformed the landscape of relative profitability. Much of the changing structure of the Australian economy was the result of the emergence of new industries founded on new production possibilities. There was a sequential dimension to this process with the developments up stream in the generation of new sources of energy, particularly electricity, being a precondition for changes down stream.
Structural change 1901-1939
The structure of the Australian economy altered in many ways in the first half of the twentieth century. The big picture is a relative growth of manufacturing that is nearly offset by a contraction in rural and mining activity with the large service sector remaining at a roughly constant figure. National income account data of product indicate shifts in the relative importance at a sector level. 3 The broad shifts revealed by these indicators are mirrored by changes in the distribution of the workforce. 4 Research on particular sectors, industries or regions provides evidence of absolute expansion or decline that adds detail and nuance to the broad sweep of the aggregate data, including the shifting balance between the size of the public and private sector. 5 Together the GDP and employment series demonstrate the broad sweep of change in the structure of the economy from 1901 up to WWII. The data is shown in Tables 1 and 2 below. Manufacturing grew significantly both in terms of its share of employment, from 15 to 24 per cent, and its share of output, 13 to 18 per cent, from a low base. Its expansion was broadly matched by the contraction in the primary sector, a decline in share of employment from 33 to 24 per cent and a fall in share of output from 37 to 28 per cent. Services, to which the utilities of gas, electricity and water, and construction are added to become the tertiary sector, were the cornerstone of the economy with a largely unchanged contribution as an employer and income generator at around the low 50 per cent for both employment and product. The data are widely recognized as robust indicators of trends. However, there are difficulties in using them as measures of structural change. The two key references are Butlin (1962) and Keating (1973) who constructed the long term estimates of national accounts and workforce data respectively. These series have been subject to commentary and revisions. 6 There are a number of problems. These data rely heavily on the Production Bulletins covering farming, mining and manufacturing and the population Census. The very large service sector is practically invisible. Attempts to calculate its output are bedeviled by the intangible nature of the product. Valuations of its inputs are used instead. This places great reliance on the accuracy of the employment series in services, which rest heavily on inter-census interpolation that masks year to year fluctuations, and wage data that is less than comprehensive. Further conceptual and practical issues arise in drawing boundaries between the sectors. Some authors, such as Dowie, aggregate the nine industry classification used by Butlin to a threefold classification, viz, primary, secondary and tertiary. 7 This process involves making important decisions about boundaries, particularly about whether mining should be included with the rural sector or with manufacturing, and whether industries such as construction and utilities that have tangible product should be separated from 'services'.
If our purpose is to trace the changing structure of the economy over time then data at the highest level of disaggregation is most useful. The industry classifications adopted in the Production Bulletins are too broad to identify the supply side responses to changes in relative profitability. The industry sub-divisions, akin to two-digit ANZSIC data, and sub-categories, the equivalent of the three-digit ANZSIC data, disguise as much as they reveal. This data was simply not fine grained enough to allow the observation of the emergence of new industries, products or processes as they happened. The first Manufacturing statistics were published in the Production Bulletin in 1907. From that time until a major revision of the manufacturing sub-divisions in 1931 the number of industries classified had risen from 100 to 115. fields of industrial enterprise and by the splitting and overlapping of fields previously conventionally definable, by the emergence of new occupations, crafts and callings, [and] by the further specialization and division of labour…' 9 Explanations of Structural Change Describing the structural transformation has proven to be more straightforward than explaining what caused it to take place. The aggregate data captures the net outcome of hundreds of thousands of decisions taken by businesses and households in any year. The 'shape' of the economy 10 altered continuously as entrepreneurs, investors and workers readjusted their behaviours in the light of a set of price signals. The most relevant sets of information were the terms of trade between industries 11 and the relative profitability of firms between industries, the latter showing the return to investing in a bundle of resources to produce those goods and services.
The existing literature has focused most of its attention on one set of price signals, tariffs and subsidies. Tariffs rose from 1907 onwards driving a wedge between domestic and 'free trade' prices for manufactures.
12 There are two indices of the 'height' of the tariff. The first is a simple average of the revenue collected divided by the value of net imports, both dutiable and total, entering the country in the same year. 13 Graph 1 shows that the average rate of duty paid on those imports on which duty was payable remained roughly constant from 1903 until the beginning of WWI when it fell until 1921 before rising above pre-war levels before the onset of the 1929 depression. Average rates rose sharply thereafter, inflated by primage duty that was levied from 1931 until 1939. The ratio of duty paid on all imports followed the same broad pattern although the percentage of imports admitted free of duty fluctuated by rising before the WWI, falling in the 1920s 14 The simple average method has a downward bias in that, ceteris paribus, the higher the rate of duty the lower the value of imports and so the less duty collected. Another study has recalculated the data, using a sample of commodities for which corresponding import and production figures are available, using local production and imports as the denominator. 15 This series, an index, shows higher rates of increase in the 'weight' of the tariff than the simple average especially during the 1920s.
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Governments also altered the ratio of domestic to 'free trade' prices through other means, primarily subsidies to domestic producers. Bounties and subsidies were paid to producers in many industries. However, the farming industries were the major recipients. The form of subsidy ranged from producers receiving cash grants through to being provided with transport services at less than cost and price support schemes. 16 A number of attempts were made in the late 1920s and 1930s to estimate the value of this assistance. 17 The authors of The Australian Tariff calculated that the subsidy equivalent of the tariff to manufacturing was £26m in 1926-27 while primary industries were not far behind receiving £22m. By 1932-33, the subsidy equivalent paid to primary industry had risen to £29m with the amount going to manufacturing having fallen to £19m. 18 Contemporary economists decried the allocative effect of tariffs and subsidies. 19 They argued, in some memorable prose, that these policies distorted markets in ways that led to a loss of national welfare. Shann, for instance, wrote in 1929 of the creation a system of 'faked prices' that 'deranges and weakens [the] whole economy.' 20 Benham asserted that 'there has been deliberate interference with the "price-mechanism,"' 21 likening this to the actions of a 'Dictator.' 22 All agreed that Australia's comparative advantage lay in its resource-based industries. The farm and mining industries were exporters who of necessity accepted the world price for their products. In contrast, manufacturing and services were sheltered from world markets, the former because of tariffs and the latter by its non-tradeable nature. The export sector could not pass on higher costs to its customers whereas the sheltered industries could. Tariffs raised the input costs of the export sector so narrowing its margins. Moreover, increases in domestic prices feed back into higher wages through an indexation mechanism.
23 By the late 1920s there was serious concern that the process may have gone too far by threatening the viability of the export industries. The rapid increase in the level of assistance being given to the minor rural industries even before the onset of the 1930s depression served to reinforce the point. As Giblin so famously wrote:
The vision that comes is of Australia as one enormous sheep bestriding a bottomless pit, with statesman, lawyer, miner, landlord, farmer and factory hand all hanging on desperately to the locks of its abundant fleece. The limits to protection are set by what the sheep will carry, and there are definite limits to that, even if the threat of synthetic wool remains only a threat.
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The debate about the welfare loss associated with the tariff has continued to the present day. Anderson and Garnaut, encapsulate the prevailing view with the statement that 'one of the most robust conclusions from economic theory is that protection reduces per capita national income of a small economy.' 25 The analysis undertaken by Bridgen and his coauthors has been revised over the years by more formal and increasingly sophisticated modeling. 26 This literature that draws heavily from international trade theory passes over the issue of the mechanism by which tariffs caused manufacturing to grow relative to the rest of the economy in terms of the resources it used and its share of product.
The link between tariffs and subsidies and the relative expansion of manufacturing in the economy is made most clearly by Benham. Tariffs result in higher domestic prices than would be the case under free trade and also permit the manufacturer to pay higher money wages. He argues that '"protected" industries are thus rendered more profitable, and more capital and labour therefore flows towards them, than would be the case under free 20 E. Shann, An Economic History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1948, p.447. 21 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 139. 22 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 137. 23 Keith Hancock, 'The first half century of Australian wage policy -Part 2', Journal of Industrial Relations, 21, 1979, pp. 129-60. 24 Giblin, 'Costs of marketing control', p.154. trade.' 27 Moreover, '…labour and resources are deliberately diverted away from nonprotected industries and towards protected industries, or, broadly speaking, away from Primary Production and towards Manufacturing.' 28 The question is how much of the shift towards manufacturing was the result of such policies? Benham equivocates noting that the share of workers in the primary sector had fallen secularly in advanced economies as a result of technological change. He concludes that the tariff had really operated at the margin, as under free trade 'Manufacturing would have expanded to a somewhat smaller extent, and in a somewhat different way.' 29 The structure of manufacturing was altered as 'labour and resources were diverted to the more highly protected Manufacturing industries.'
30 This proposition can be tested with two sets of data. The first draws on information about the average rate of duty for 76 sub-categories of manufacturing industries, the equivalent of three-digit ANZSIC, for the year 1932-33. 31 The sample covers 66 per cent of the industry sub-categories and contains 51 per cent of total employment. We tested the relationship between the height of the tariff, as measured by the simple average of customs duty paid divided by the value of imports, and the numbers employed in each of the industries receiving protection. Conventional regression analysis showed that the errors were not normally distributed. The regression was re-run having logged the data. The null hypothesis that there is no association between tariff levels and the size of resources in an industry, using employment as a proxy, was rejected. The t statistic is 1.834055 and the P-value 0.070612, which is slightly beyond the 5 per cent limit. However, the adjusted R 2 is only 3 per cent, so we can conclude that no significant explanatory relationship existed between tariffs and employment. The results are shown in full in Appendix 1.
However, this test does not capture other influences that might effect employment by industries. Another test was undertaken to test the relationship between changes in tariff levels and changes in employment for a smaller set of industries. This procedure was possible because of data that aligns 'industry' employment data with corresponding tariff 'rates' at the two-digit ANZSIC level. From 1919 the Statistician published data that allocates imports to appropriate class of the customs' schedules. 32 We have selected ten manufacturing 'industries' that best approximate the activities covered by the customs classifications in 1918-19, 1928-29 and 1938-39 . 33 These industries account for 85, 87 27 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 138. 28 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 139. 29 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 146. Emphasis in the original. 30 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p.162. 31 Nimmo, 'The effect of the tariff', Appendix B, pp. 154-57. Only those industries were selected for whom matching employment data could be found in the Production Bulletin 1932-33, Further doubt has been cast on the link between changes in tariff rates and the expansion of manufacturing by Mark Thomas in his study of recovery from the 1930s depression.
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His analysis of the role of import substitution as a contributor to output growth throughout the inter-war period demonstrates that there was no simple relationship between increases in tariffs, and devaluation, and declining import penetration. The 1921 tariff and further revisions in 1926 and 1928 did not result in increased import substitution. 36 The decomposition of output growth shows that import substitution made a negative contribution to the growth of total expenditure between 1919-20 and 1928-29. 37 In marked contrast there was a sharp increase in the contribution of import substitution between 1928-29 and 1931-32. However, Thomas argues that this resulted more from the increased competitiveness of Australian manufacturing as domestic costs fell than from the impact of either the Scullin Tariff or devaluation. Moreover, import substitution played a negative role during the recovery phase after 1932 up to the outbreak of the war. He concludes that 'the contribution of massive import substitution to Australian recovery appears on such evidence to be a myth.' Benham and others have argued that the profits of manufacturers rose as tariffs rose. Local producers, it is alleged, will charge higher prices as tariffs rise because they can be 'passed on.'
39 Increased average revenues are assumed to result in higher profits. This is not necessarily the case. Let us suppose that imports and domestic products are perfect substitutes 40 , and that imports make up 20 per cent of the market. A new tariff of 10 per cent is imposed on imports that results in zero demand for those products. What is the appropriate response of the local firms if they are profit-maximizing? Let us also suppose and 'Musical instruments'. We have excluded customs revenues gathered for 'Ale, spirits and beverages' and 'Tobacco and preparations thereof' and 'Sugar' as the former two were the equivalent of excise while the import of sugar was effectively prohibited. 34 The results were statistically significant for four individual industries -bricks, metals, jewellery, and clothing. 35 Thomas, 'Manufacturing', pp. 246-71. 36 Thomas, 'Manufacturing', p. 252. 37 Thomas, 'Manufacturing', that each firm was in an equilibrium position, with marginal cost and marginal revenues equal, before the onset of the tariff. How will they respond to the tariff? They can raise their price to the pre-tariff price plus duty. Demand will fall correspondingly. However, by taking this action their marginal revenues will rise above marginal costs. Profit maximizing behaviour will lead each firm to increase its supply back to the pre-tariff production level so reducing the price. If the new price, with 80 per cent of the pre-tariff demand being supplied, exceeds the pre-tariff price existing firms in the industry will have an incentive to increase supply and/or new entrants would start production as long as they can do so without marginal costs exceeding marginal revenues. Production would increase to the point where the 20 per cent of the market supplied by imports has been met locally. The price would fall back to the pre-tariff level as long as there is a competitive market.
Those making the argument in the 1920s that an increase in tariffs would increase profits had seen fit to qualify the case. By raising prices after a tariff increase firms would trigger a subsequent increase in costs. Cost rises were of two sorts. The first came from the centralized wage system that automatically adjusted the Basic Wage to movements in price indexes that measured the 'cost of living'. A combination of higher prices for imports and domestic goods would feed through into quarterly 'cost of living' adjustments. 41 Secondly, insofar as firms relied on imported inputs their costs were increased. 42 In its Reports in the 1920s the Tariff Board lamented that firms were using the increase costs as a rationale for greater protection and expressed alarm at the growing divergence between money wages in Australian and overseas. 43 The impact on the margins earned by firms of these costs pressures would once again depend on industry and firm-specific factors. Industries with lower labour-capital ratios would have greater immunity than labour intensive operations. Moreover, industries will less reliance on imported inputs were better placed to cope. Whatever the industry effects might be it is hard to escape the conclusion that the supposed positive stimulus to profits given by tariffs in the first instance were quickly moderated by these feedback loops.
The impact of tariffs on profitability will depend on industry and firm-specific reactions. First, the elasticity of supply of the domestic industry matters. 44 Competitive industries are more likely to increase their supply so reducing price below the post-tariff import price than more highly concentrated ones. Local monopolies can set a price to maximize profits. Industries with binding cartel agreements could hold prices above competitive levels after the tariff was imposed. How competitive was Australian manufacturing in the first four decades of the twentieth century? The prevailing view is that many industries had high levels of seller concentration and/or engaged in collusive behaviour especially 41 See references in note 23 above. 42 Roughly three-quarters of imports were producer goods. Thomas, 'Manufacturing', p. 266 and notes 14 & 15. 43 Brigden, et.al., The Australian Tariff, Appendix C. 44 '…the capacity to increase prices differs greatly between …industries. It depends upon the conditions of supply and demand for the goods produced. Where demand is fairly rigid, and the supply is responsive to market conditions, the necessary increase in prices may be almost automatic. Differences in conditions of supply are probably the more important causes of differences in capacity to increase prices to cover the costs imposed.' Brigden, et.al., The Australian Tariff, p.53 with respect to price agreements. 45 A recent study has found that the increase in seller concentration in many manufacturing industries before WWII was the result of the adoption of new technologies that allowed for significant economies of scale. 46 Barriers to entry rose quickly in those industries where firms could reap economics of scale or establish powerful brands. 47 Firms enjoying market power defended their above normal returns behind barriers to entry that became increasingly difficult for new entrants to breach. Incumbency delivered more than scale economies in production. That advantage was reinforced by privileged access to technology through patents or licensing agreements, registered trade marks and brand acceptance, established relationships with suppliers and distributors, internally generated competencies gained by experience, superior organizational design, and privileged access to finance through retained earnings and the ability to raise debt and equity more cheaply. 48 However, these barriers were breached if the rewards on offer were large enough. There was entry into even highly concentrated industries such as glass, rubber tyres and confectionary by both foreign and domestic firms. 49 A recent study has shown that profitability and new capital issues, both in manufacturing and the economy as a whole, followed very similar trajectories through the interwar period. This would suggest that new investment flowed unimpeded into profitable industries and products. 50 Technological change and changes in labour-capital ratios were commonplace in the economy. Often the two were associated as technology was embodied in new machinery that reduced the need for labour or substituted lower cost process workers for craftsmen. The importance of these developments has been underplayed in the literature, which has focused its attention on the gap between productivity levels in Australia and overseas. Our concern is on the impact of such investments on relative profitability amongst firms within the domestic industry. In such circumstances, competitive advantage amongst firms within an industry could swing in favour of those undertaking most investment in new production methods. Firms with lower costs had an incentive to increase supply to the point where the new equilibrium price was lower than the pre-tariff price. Is there evidence to support this argument? Colin Forster concluded after a careful review of the data that 'although it is impossible to measure with precision the growth of manufacturing productivity in Australia during the 1920s, general considerations indicate that the increase was substantial.' 51 Mark Thomas argues that Australian manufacturing increased in competitiveness vis-a-vis imports in the 1930s through a combination of 'the increased efficiency of Australian industry and declining input prices.' 52 This resulted in part from the growth of the local market that permitted the realization of economies of scale in some industries but, Forster suggests, was insufficient to provide minimum efficient scale for those capital-intensive and science-based industries of the second industrial revolution. 53 However, new technologies were adopted in many industries that provided an opportunity for incumbents or entrants to reshape the nature of 'rivalry'. 54 Moreover, there was the substitution of machinery for labour on a large scale across a wide range of industries. Once again, there were marked differences in the extent and timing of this process between industries that could explain the reconfiguration of industry structure.
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Rural industries and the burden of 'excess costs'
The counter point to the rise of manufacturing was the decline of the farm and mining industries. The earlier literature makes a clear connection between the two events. Costs in the export sector were pushed higher because of higher wage and input costs resulting from tariff protection. Unlike the 'sheltered' industries, the exporting rural and mining industries could not 'pass on' higher costs in the world's commodity markets in which they were price takers. Primary producers and miners were caught between upward pressures on costs and a commodity cycle that turned downwards from the mid-1920s before collapsing in 1929. 56 Agricultural economists would predict a relative contraction in the size of the primary sector over the long term because of the underlying elasticity of demand and supply. 57 As income grows the demand for foodstuffs does not rise proportionately. Freebairn reports that the estimates for the income elasticity for foodstuffs in Australia range from 0.21 to 0.76. 58 This would have been the case in export markets as well. Demand for the products of Australian's rural producers and miners grew more slowly as incomes rose at home and abroad. The prospects facing primary producers turned against them in the inter-war period as world demand and supply schedules shifted inward and outward, respectively, turning the terms of trade sharply against them. Demand for wool and mineral products such as coal and iron ore and non-ferrous metals was hostage to the fortunes facing those products that used them as inputs. Prices of Australian exports were softened by slower 51 growth in Western Europe markets in the 1920s and by improvements in efficiency in production processes. Moreover, an excess of supply entering the world economy in the 1920s precipitated a dramatic drop in prices in 1929 and depressed them for the rest of the decade. 59 Increasing productivity in primary industries meant that demand could be met with a smaller share of resources, especially labour. Sinclair has argued that the rural frontier was closing by the 1920s. 60 This signaled the end to a century old 'model' of economic development that involved bringing more and more land into production. Declining rainfall as farmers moved inland set the geographic limits for settlement. Farming practices, particularly repeated plantings of wheat, was diminishing soil fertility. A corollary is an inelastic supply schedule with respect to price for Australian farm products after the 1920s. In contrast, Freebairn presents a more optimistic picture with a range of technical advances offsetting the caprices of nature. 61 The slower expansion in area under crop in the 1930s would seem to have been the result of falling prices rather than declining marginal productivity. 62 A combination of low income elasticity of demand for primary products and an elastic supply response can account for a 'natural' process of long term decline in the importance of the sector in the economy. Was this process accelerated by the 'excess cost' imposed by the tariff? Insofar as farmers and miners purchased imported inputs whose prices were inflated by the tariff, the answer would be in the affirmative. However, there were a number of offsetting effects. The distribution of the 'burden' fell unevenly amongst the various agricultural and mining industries. In the late 1930s the majority of farm products exported less than a half of their output, with wool, dried vine fruits and wheat as the outliers. 63 Home price support schemes lifted domestic prices above export prices for a number of products, most notably dairy products, dried vine fruits, canned fruits, wine and sugar. The aggregate level of support given to the farm sector had come to exceed that received by manufacturing in 1932-33. 64 It is likely that this figure rose further as a result of the 'operation of substantial Commonwealth and State programs for special financial assistance, bounties, debt adjustment, and reappraisal of capital values and rentals of crown lands.' 65 Rural assistance may have prevented a faster outflow of resources from the farm sector in the 1930s. Moreover, the mining industries recovered their position in the economy strongly in the 1930s as a result of the rising price of gold and as coal and base metals were subject to higher levels of domestic demand to generate electricity and feed the furnaces of the metal industries.
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Services: the elephant in the room As shown in Tables 1 and 2 above, services dominate both the farm sector and manufacturing in terms of both employment and output with shares of above 40 per cent. Students of the services sector in advanced economies, beginning with Fischer and Clark, had argued that this industry would 'naturally' expand relative to other sectors because of its above unity income elasticity of demand and its lower levels of labour productivity. 67 As incomes rose, consumers would spend disproportionately on services rather than foodstuffs or commodities. Moreover, the nature of production of most services, highly labour intensive and non-storable, would not permit the sorts of productivity increases occurring elsewhere in the economy. Consequently, the share of employment in the service sector would be expected to rise more rapidly than its share of product.
One of the key questions we face in discussing structural change in the Australian economy is the modest growth in services share of output and its constant share of employment. This leads to a consideration of two issues. The first is the rate at which incomes and the demand for services grew. A comparison of per capita GDP figures suggests little growth from the depression of the 1890s until World War II. Butlin refers to a 'drastic retardation' when compared to the earlier and later periods. 68 However, this pessimistic view has been challenged on a number of conceptual and empirical grounds by other scholars. 69 They suggest that GDP has been underestimated because the way it has been calculated fails to capture the value of the consumption of public sector infrastructure. Moreover, they point to a number of partial measures that suggest living standards had risen appreciably such as increased life expectancy, shorter working hours, earlier retirement ages, better quality housing, higher education attainments and widespread ownership of consumer durables. Factoring in the effects of alternate consumption deflators, shorter hours, earlier retirement and increased life expectancy would substantially life the growth of per capita GDP. 70 These upward revisions make the small growth in the share of services compared to manufacturing all the more puzzling.
The second issue is whether productivity levels were lower and growth rates slower in the service sector than elsewhere? After a careful review of the issues, Carter concludes that the 'evidence does not support the conventional wisdom that service industries on the whole produce a lower output per worker and have increased their productivity at a lower rate than manufacturing or agriculture.' 71 This view would again provide a partial explanation for the failure for services, particularly its share of employment, to have grown relative to the rest of the economy.
Study of changes of the composition of the service industries throw up further questions. 72 Those industries that might be expected to have the highest income elasticity of demand and low productivity growth, the 'luxuries' of restaurants, clubs and hotels, and personal services and domestic services, stagnated or lost ground. Alternative explanations to those of income elasticity and low productivity levels are required. Carter provides two explanations of the demand for services that have differing impacts on the growth of the sector. The first involves a substitution of goods for services as the relative prices react to slower productivity growth in services. The examples given are wealthy households substituting motor cars for public transport and household durables to substitute for domestic service and entertainment. The availability of an alternate set of manufactured goods that substitute for service activity, all of which are products of the second industrial revolution, is a pre-condition for these consumption decisions whose net effect is to slow the growth of the service sector. By way of contrast, the expansion of services to businesses and government for intermediate rather than final demand purposes drove the growth of the service sector independently of income elasticity or productivity. The growth of business services in the broad was 'simply a result of increasing specialization and division of labour.' 73 The role of the government as a provider of services also helps to explain the size and composition of the industry. Political decisions led to increasing state outlays on service such as the provision of public administration, health and educational services, the gradual 'nationalization' of water and sewerage, power and gas, and urban transport systems. Moreover, public sector investment rose significantly compared to private nonresidential investment, reflecting commitments to both rural and increasingly urban needs, infrastructure in the latter being a lagged response to population growth and industrialization. 74 However, industry classifications used by Butlin in his estimations of GDP make it impossible to distinguish between publicly and privately provided services. 75 
An Alternative Explanation of Structural Change
The existing literature provides a gloomy picture of the Australian economy in the first four decades of the twentieth century. It had been subject to strong cyclical effects, two 71 Carter, 'The service sector', p.207. 72 Carter, 'The service sector', Table 8 .5, p. 214. 73 Carter, 'The service sector, p. 222. 74 Sinclair, 'Capital formation'. 75 Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, and 'Perspectives.' depressions and a war. Moreover, its trend rate of per capita growth was disappointing. Part of the reason for this was because public policy shifted resources towards industries with lower productivity than the export oriented rural industries. Australia's competitive position in the international economy was weakened as productivity in its manufacturing was well below that of its trading partners. Insult was added to injury as the protection of manufacturing imposed greater costs on the rural industries so disadvantaging them in export markets.
An alternative view is that the Australian economy was dynamic in that entrepreneurs and business people responded to the many opportunities presented to them. Our contention is that the nature of the Australian economy was markedly different in 1939 from what it had been in 1900. The range of goods and services on offer was far wider. Changes in consumption patterns provided opportunities for firms to develop new markets, Edith Penrose's interstices. 76 The technologies underpinning production and distribution were far more advanced. Cost functions were realigned by the adoption of new technology, much of which was labour saving. Changes in demand and supply schedules across the economy prompted firms to adjust their behaviours in an attempt to lift profitability or to ward off failure. Shifts in demand and supply factors were played out in thousands of micro-markets in which firms competed. Factors exogenous to the firms were responsible for some of the shifts in both the demand and supply schedules. However, firms increasingly built the capabilities to influence the demand for their products through branding and advertising, and to create superior production technologies. The resultant effect on changes in demand and supply factors over time was reflected in a shifting in relative profitability between industries down to very narrow product categories.
Modern Consumerism
A number of powerful drivers of change can be identified on the demand side. There was a strong demonstration effect from the United States and the United Kingdom about what was on offer. Australians wanted to experience what was new and different. The 1920s in particular was a decade of experimentation. Expenditure patterns shifted under the weight of three forces: a growing demand for consumer durables; a growing preference for entertainment and leisure activities; and the emergence of a new category of expenditure, fast moving consumer goods.
Australian consumers and producers were aware of the new consumer products, particularly consumer durables, coming onto markets in North America and Europe after WWI. Immigrants brought this personal knowledge with them. Australian residents saw this 'new' world through the medium of letters from relatives living abroad, newspapers, magazines and cinema and in shop windows. They observed the purchases of their family and friends. What might have seemed unobtainable luxuries became necessities for more 76 Edith Penrose, Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 1959. and more families under the siren call of advertising. 77 Household budgets were rearranged in the light of an expanding set of products and services.
The decade of the 1920s has been identified as the beginning of Australia's progress to becoming 'a modern consumer society.' 78 A sufficient number of households possessed the discretionary income to purchase motor cars and a range of household appliances. Hire purchase facilities allowed the cost to be spread over a number of years. Whitwell argues that these expenditures rose rapidly in the second half of the decade before falling away in the depression and war. The extraordinary growth of consumer spending after 1945 was the start of a new era rather than a continuation of a longer process. 79 However, there are a range of indicators to suggest that the demand for consumer durables continued strongly throughout the 1930s. For instance, the sale of radios quickened markedly. In 1929 there was one radio licence for every 20 people. Within a decade the number had risen to one in six. The number of telephones in use also rose from one in every 12 people in 1929 to one in every ten by 1939. Motor car sales continued to grow throughout the 1930s. The number of motor vehicles registered, including motor cars, commercial vehicles and motor cycles, rose from one for every 12 people to one in every eight and a half. More people were driving. The number of people licensed to drive rose from one in every 43 in 1919, to one in every eight in 1929 and to one in every six in 1939. They drove further during the 1930s with the volume of petrol consumed rising faster than the number of registered vehicles, 75 compared to 50 per cent. 80 The increased consumption of motor vehicles and household consumer durables such as radios, washing machines, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners and the like necessarily lagged behind investments in the construction of sealed roads and the provision of electricity and gas. State and local governments made those investments on a large scale in the 1920s and 1930s. 81 Private providers had also entered the energy sector from the late nineteenth century. A hybrid system of state and private providers continued up to WWII but the government utilities absorbed many of the smaller private firms. An increasing number of households were connected to gas and electricity. Whitwell reports that 34 per cent of homes in Australia had electricity in 1923 and that the number rose sharply later in the decade. 82 Further growth was experienced in the 1930s. By 1939 all the electricity providers in Victoria, the SECV and the rest, had 397,944 customers, in an area that held 85 per cent of the State's population. 83 The number connected was more than threequarters of all the dwellings, shops and factories in the state. 84 The 1947 Census confirms an almost complete coverage of private houses in the metropolitan cities, 97 per cent of houses were connected to electricity. 83 per cent were connected to gas, and nearly threequarters used a gas stove. 85 Nationwide, 78 per cent of private dwellings had electricity; just two points shy of the figure for the United States of America in 1941. 86 There was a growing market for electrical appliances which provided opportunities for local producers and distributors. A substantial electrical manufacturing industry had been established in the 1920s. 87 It continued to expand in the 1930s as sales of washing machines, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators and gas cookers and heaters continued to grow. The market was served by a combination of local manufacturers, many of whom were foreign owned, and importers. The distribution channels ranged from door to door salesmen, to specialist stores and department stores. Hire purchase or some form of vendor finance was common for the more expensive items. 88 Consumption patterns altered in the face of rising incomes, the advent of new technologies and shorter hours. More was spent on entertainment and leisure pursuits. Two illustrations suffice to make the point. First, the popular entertainments of the nineteenth century, the circus, music hall and live theatre, were challenged by the arrival of the cinema in the 1920s. The speed with which it became a mass medium is astonishing. 89 By 1927 there were 1,250 theatres that had sold 110 million tickets that year. Gross receipts were £5.5 million. Investment in the theatres was estimated to be £25 million and 20,000 people worked in the industry. 90 Sport and recreation played an increasingly important part in Australian life. School children were dragooned into organized physical activity. Participation was fostered through school, church, neighbourhood and district competitions covering every sport from archery to volley ball. Their parents might choose fishing, sailing, bowls or golf. Recreational activity became institutionalized with state and national organizations taking charge in all of the major sporting codes. Sport became mass entertainment as attendances at football matches, test cricket and racing rose. 91 Much of the infrastructure was provided by local government and churches. However, there were plenty of opportunities left for businessmen. 92 The demand for sporting equipment and specialized apparel including footwear grew. 93 Large crowds at cricket grounds, boxing stadiums and race tracks required transport, food and drink, and at the latter, gambling facilities. Posters, tickets and programs gave additional work to printers and newspapers' sports sections feed the public's demand for results and information.
Fast moving consumer goods became an important part of expenditure patterns after WWI. Until that time the category would have been confined to a small range of products, cigarettes, pipe tobacco, toiletries and confectionery. The list lengthened in the 1920s and 1930s to include cosmetics such as face creams, lipstick, nail polish, 94 toothpaste and over the counter drugs such as 'Aspro'. 95 Confectionery also became big business as the homemade or unbranded sweets of pre-WWI were replaced by branded chocolates and toffees, and chewing gum. The soft drink market was transformed by the adoption of the crown seal and commercial refrigeration. 96 Children became important consumers in their own right, not only through their expenditures of pocket money but as a new segment in the food market. The first wave of convenience foods for breakfast, cereals, school lunches, vegemite and processed cheese, and after school and bed time snacks, ice cream, milk chocolate and cocoa came from the giant foreign food corporations of Kellogg's, Kraft, Nestle, Cadbury's and the local Peters. 97 These types of products, along with canned fruit and baked beans, came in new and improved forms of packaging.
Supply Side Shifts
The economy was also experiencing a number of important changes on the supply side that would in turn disturb existing equilibrium positions. Three will be considered briefly below. The first is the marked increase in specialization of function; the second is a refashioning of distribution channels; and the third is the growing importance of intellectual property as a firm resource and as a source of competitive advantage.
The expansion of the economy in the first half of the twentieth century permitted increased specialization of function across the board. Butlin argues that the 'gradual separation' of the 'institutional combination of manufacturing, trade and transport function, the confusion of rural production, construction, transport and selling activities' was a 'basic feature of pre-1914 and interwar growth.' This might, a priori, 'enlarge opportunities for increased efficiency.' 98 Specialization could reduce costs independent of scale as firms improve efficiency as a result of cumulative experience. 99 Evidence of the growth in specialization can be found in trade directories. This process of specialization was particularly evident in wholesale and retail distribution. The role of the importing wholesaler, once the most important conduit between Australian retailers and their foreign suppliers, was diminishing. The tariff played its part. However, many of the larger retailers, particularly the department stores, established their own buying offices abroad. 101 Increasingly, these large metropolitan city-based stores either integrated backwards into production or formed close links with domestic producers in relationships that exhibited considerable countervailing power. Sidney Myer's store in Bourke Street, Melbourne, borrowing freely from models in the United States, became the pace setter for department stores in the 1920s and 1930s. New types of specialist retailer were emerging. Chain stores such as Moran and Cato in groceries, O.Gilpin's in drapery and ironmongery, and G. J. Coles in variety goods were well advanced before 1939. 102 The expanding use of the motor car brought dealerships, garages selling petrol and providing repairs, and used car lots in its wake. The general store was challenged by specialist retailers, such as grocers, Manchester, hardware and home wares. 103 The clothing stores segmented the market into women's and men's clothes, and youths and children. Moreover, hats, corsets, fur coats, gloves and shoes for women would be sold in different establishments. Purchases were driven by events such as parties and weddings, the changing season and fashions rather than need. New forms of food retailers started to trade in the 1930s, delicatessens, soda fountains and the soon to be ubiquitous milk bar. 104 Additions to capital stock have figured prominently in the explanations of output and productivity growth before WWII. 105 It is important to also recognize the growing importance of intellectual property to firms. Knowledge and know how was embedded in organizational routines. 106 Australian firms imported technology on a large scale, a process that often included the transfer of machinery, blue prints and skilled workers to assemble and train the local operatives. Examples can be drawn from steel, glass and fertilizer industries. 107 Businesses sought exclusive access to their own technology through patents and to imported technology and the products it could make through the licensing agreements. Products were branded and heavily promoted where ever possible. Firms registered trade marks and paid fees to foreign firms use their trade marks on products made under licence to protect their property rights. These intangible assets were a source of competitive advantage to firms and a source of barriers to entry and mobility in many industries. Further, their existence was a factor contributing to differing rates of profits between and within industries. 108 Changes in demand or in supply conditions had widespread repercussions across the economy. The point is most simply made with reference to motor cars and electricity. The growing demand for motor cars affected a number of up stream industries other than car companies such as oil companies, road construction contractors, suppliers of aggregate and asphalt, manufacturers and installers of tariff signals. Consumption of motor cars generated a new class of insurance risk, signaling increased competition within the insurance industry, and spurred the development of the hire purchase industry. Down stream garages sprang up to provide fuel, service and repair cars, with panel beaters and spray painters emerging as separate entities. Used car yards, wreckers and scrap metal merchants dealt with the older models. Motorists formed associations that vigorously promoted their interests against competing users of road space. 109 Commercial users of motor trucks, buses and cars arose apace. The truck became a major source of transport in the 1930s, while bus and taxi fleets 110 also expanded. Electricity generation had a pervasive impact on the economy. It reached back to the domestic coal mining industry as a source of energy and spawned hydroelectric schemes. Heavy engineering met its needs for both generation and transmission. Power was essential for the expansion of the telephone network, which had its own feedback loop to business productivity by reducing communication costs. Power to factories greatly increased their productivity. In the 1930s many small tools such as drills and grinders, once hand tools, were fixed to a bench and power driven. The capacity of pumps and compressors also increased. 111 Electricity transformed offices by being used for lighting, lifts, hot water systems, air conditioning, refrigeration, and to power office equipment such as calculating machines. By the late 1930s electrical appliances had invaded every room in the house. The State Electricity Commission of Victoria, for instance, boasted that there were 21 types of equipment other than lighting available. 112 
Conclusion
If we shift our attention from the issues of Australia's comparative advantage and its costs and productivity relative to those of its trading partners a different picture emerges. During the first four decades of the twentieth century the economy added to its stock of resources: labour, capital and technology or know how. The allocation of these resources within the economy altered significantly, manufacturing grew, the rural sector shrank by the same amount and the tertiary sector remained roughly constant. The question is what motivated this reallocation. The conventional story has been one of tariffs and subsidies interfering with relative prices. We contend that this is at best a partial explanation as it applies only to the 'tradeable' sector of the economy. The size and composition of the large tertiary sector remains unexplained. Moreover, the tariffs and subsidies story does not provide a convincing explanation of how profits in manufacturing would rise both absolutely and relatively after an increase in the tariff.
McLean and Pincus offered the tantalizing comment that 'there is the possibility that the nature of economic growth [between 1890 and 1940] was different from that in the preceding and subsequent periods of much faster growth…' 113 We would agree that the process of growth is not well understood. Our contention is that new opportunities for profitable investment were becoming available in many parts of the economy because of changes on the demand and supply side. Many of these changes were exogenous to Australia. The demonstration effect was strong for both households and businesses. Information about new products and services, and the technology required to produce them flowed freely into the country. Households shifted their preferences towards consumer durables, entertainment and leisure and fast moving consumer goods. These decisions were at the heart of Snooks' 114 discussion of the changing boundaries between household and total economy. Up to WWII households were increasingly 'buying' goods and services that were previously produced and consumed within the family unit. Large scale investment in public infrastructure was a precondition that had been largely met by the mid-1920s. Increased profits awaited those firms first to market or who could develop a sustainable competitive advantage. Changes on the supply side such as the efficiency gains associated with specialization, new distribution channels to satisfy customer demands and a growing reliance on inimitable proprietary assets provide additional or complementary paths to profitable investments. Finally, we argue that the outcomes of these shifts in both demand and supply had large scale linkage effects across the economy. 
